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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides some new evidence on the determinants of long run operating and share price 
performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). It has 
been hypothesised that the information contained in the pre listing documents could shed some 
light on the aftermarket performance of South African IPO shares. In line with previous literature, 
South African IPO shares significantly underperformed the market on average. Additionally, there 
is a statistically significant negative relationship between IPO Volume and long run performance, 
suggesting that the South African IPO market may be subject to the ‘fads and over optimism’ 
theory of Ritter (1991). The overoptimism hypothesis is further cemented by a negative correlation 
between pre IPO revenue forecast and aftermarket operating performance. Listing expenses play 
a moderate role in the reduction of the aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE. However, it 
appears that international investment banks have a positive influence on the aftermarket 
performance of IPOs on the JSE. Likewise, firms audited by the BIG 4 audit firms tend to perform 
well in terms of aftermarket buy and hold returns. Large firms at the time of listing tend to 
perform well and firms with high growth prospects at the time of listing generate a negative and 
significant return on their investment in total assets. Although the contingent liabilities disclosed 
in the prelisting reports negatively influence most of the measurers of aftermarket performance, 
the relationship is, by and large, insignificant. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
here are a number of studies that have documented a significant systematic increase from the offer 
price to the closing share price on the first day of trading. For example, Stoll and Curley (1970), 
Reilly (1973), and Ibbotson (1975) provide early evidence of systematic underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs). Related to this is the ‘hot issue’ market phenomenon, in which issues in certain time periods 
display abnormally higher short-run aftermarket performance than during other periods (first documented by 
Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975). Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) also report evidence that in the long run, 
IPOs appear to be overpriced; the shares of issuing firms significantly underperform those of industry- and size-
matched, non-issuing firms and the broad market for several years following an IPO. This phenomenon is not 
exclusive to the United States of America (USA, hereafter, US). For instance, short-run underpricing and/or long run 
underperformance of IPOs has been documented in the United Kingdom (UK) (Levis, 1993; Chambers & Dimson, 
2009), Germany (Gunther & Rummer, 2011), Japan (Moshirian, Ng, & Wu, 2010), and Australia (Lee, Taylor, & 
Walter, 1996). Most importantly, for the purposes of this paper, similar patterns in IPO performance have been 
found in a number of emerging markets, for instance in China (Chan, Wang, & Wei, (2004); Su & Bangassa, 
(2011)) and in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Aggarwal, Leal, & Hernandez, 1993). 
T 
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The South African literature has documented similar patterns in long run IPO performance. For instance, 
Page and Reyneke (1997) and M’Kombe and Ward (2002) document significant long run underperformance of IPOs 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the 1980-1991 and 1980-1998 sample periods respectively. Alli, 
Subrahmanyam, and Gleason (2010) later examined the implications of financial liberalisation on JSE IPO data 
ranging from 1995 to 2004, and they document, inter alia, significant initial positive returns, suggesting high 
underpricing for the post liberalisation epoch. It appears from the South African literature that the issues relating to 
the degree of IPO underpricing and the long run underperformance of South African IPO shares have been well 
documented. However, the information contained in the prelisting documents of IPOs could help explain the long 
run performance of firms listing on the JSE. Hanley and Hoberg (2010) have demonstrated that the information 
contained in IPO prospectuses influences the valuation of IPO shares and the degree of underpricing. Pursuant to 
this argument, we conjecture that there are a number of factors contained in the IPO pre listing documents that could 
be linked to the aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE: Firstly, the magnitude of listing costs could have a 
significant bearing on the aftermarket performance of the listing company. These costs, albeit small relative to the 
size of the companies listing, could have been utilised for capitalising the business further, in order to enhance the 
future profitability of the firms. Secondly, the optimism reflected by revenue forecasts disclosed in the listing firms’ 
prospectuses could be linked to long run underperformance of firms listing on the JSE. The overreaction, fads, and 
over optimism phenomenon identified by Ritter (1991) suggests that managers could overestimate the future 
performance of their firms. Thirdly, the disclosure of key material aspects such as contingent liabilities and litigation 
statements in the prospectuses could proxy for risk of an IPO, and this could negatively affect the aftermarket 
performance of listing firms. Lastly, the following firm level characteristics warrant further examination; the size of 
the board, age, firm size, and the domicile of the listing firm. These are some of the factors that have largely been 
ignored in the South African literature. Thus the main contribution of this paper is to provide alternative 
explanations to the factors that contribute to the long run aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE.  
 
In line with other empirical studies, it is shown that, in the long run, South African IPO shares over the 
sample period significantly underperformed the market on average. Additionally, regression analyses reveal that 
there is a statistically significant negative relationship between long run performance (as measured by the return on 
equity) and both annual IPO volume and pre listing revenue forecast, suggesting that the South African IPO market 
may be subject to the ‘fads and over optimism’ theory of Ritter (1991). Listing expenses play a moderate role in the 
determination of the aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE. However, it appears that international investment 
banks have a positive influence on the aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE. Likewise, firms audited by the 
BIG 4 audit firms tend to perform well in terms of aftermarket buy and hold and benchmark adjusted returns. Large 
firms at the time of listing tend to perform well and firms with high growth prospects at the time of listing generate a 
negative and significant return on their investment in total assets. Although the contingent liabilities disclosed in the 
prelisting reports negatively influence most of the measurers of aftermarket performance, the relationship is, by and 
large, insignificant. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section two reviews key academic literature on IPO 
performance around the world. Section three discusses the data and methodology used in the study. Section four 
reports the results of the paper, and Section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 International Evidence on Share-Price Performance of IPOs 
 
The issue of the systematic underpricing of IPOs has been widely documented in the literature. A number 
of early studies (See Stoll & Curley (1970); Reilly (1973); and Ibbotson (1975)) document a systematic increase 
from the offer price to the closing share price on the first day of trading. In other words, initial public offerings on 
average earn systematically positive first-day returns. Ritter and Welch (2002) analyse 6,249 IPOs in the US for the 
period 1980-2001. They find that IPOs earn an average first-day return of 18.8%, although the magnitude of 
underpricing varies across time. For example, average first-day returns to IPOs during the 1980-1989 sub-period 
were 7.4%, while during the 1995-1998 sub-period, average first-day returns were substantially higher at 18.1%. In 
fact, during the period of the ‘internet bubble’ (1999-2000), IPOs displayed average first-day returns of 65.0%. 
Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) examine the variability of IPO initial returns for a sample of 8,759 IPOs in the 
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US and they find that initial returns exhibit substantial volatility, especially in hot issue markets, and that the 
variability of these returns fluctuates substantially over time. 
 
Researchers have further documented that, in the long run, IPO shares underperform. For example, Ritter 
(1991) examines a sample of 1,526 IPOs in the US for the period 1975-1984, and reports three main issues; firstly, 
issuing firms substantially underperform a control portfolio of firms matched by size and industry from the closing 
price on the first day of public trading to their three-year anniversaries. Specifically, the average holding period 
return for this sample of IPOs of ordinary shares in the three years after going public (excluding initial returns) is 
34.47%, but a control sample of shares matched by size and industry earned an average return during the same three-
year holding period of 61.86%. Secondly, as is the case with short-run performance, the pattern of long run 
performance of IPOs in the study is cyclical: firms issuing in high-volume years tend to display higher levels of long 
run underperformance. Finally, the pattern of long run IPO performance varies across industry: during the 1975-
1984 sample period, oil and gas IPO shares performed particularly poorly, while those of banks and financial 
institutions displayed superior long run performance. Research in the US has also shown that IPO performance is 
driven by the quality of the venture capital partner and underwriter respectively. For example, Krishnan, Ivanov, 
Masulis, and Singh (2011) show that firms backed by reputable venture capital firms perform well in the long run. 
This is mainly because reputable venture capital firms continue to play a role in the corporate governance of the IPO 
firms following listing. In addition, Dong, Michel, and Pandes (2011) find that US IPOs backed by quality 
underwriters outperform IPOs backed by low quality underwriters. The authors further show that underwriter quality 
has a positive impact on the aftermarket performance of IPOs with high uncertainty. Further evidence suggests that 
IPO underperformance is influenced by acquisition activity by newly listed firms; Brau, Couch, and Sutton (2012) 
find that US IPOs that engage in acquisition activity in the first year after going public significantly underperform 
non-acquiring IPO firms. The authors report mean three-year buy and hold abnormal returns of -15.6% for newly 
listed acquiring firms compared to returns of 5.9% for non-acquiring firms.  
 
The patterns of IPO performance are not specific to the US. It is clear that short-run underpricing and long 
run underperformance of IPO shares is a truly global phenomenon. A significant body of international evidence 
supports this, although it is clear that the magnitude of short- and long run IPO performance varies across countries 
and time. For example, Levis (1993) reports average first day returns of 14.3% and significant long run 
underperformance relative to three alternative benchmarks over 36 months post-issue, for a sample of 712 IPOs in 
the UK from 1980-1988. In a later study, Levis (2011) finds that private equity backed IPOs perform better than 
venture capital backed and non-backed IPOs in the UK. In fact, the author finds that Private Equity backed IPOs’ 
aftermarket returns remain positive and statistically significant over the sample period. Ljunqvist (1997) documents 
average first-day underpricing of 9.2% and market-adjusted returns of -12.1% over three years post-issue for a 
sample of 189 German IPOs for the period 1970 to 1993. Gunther and Rummer (2011) further show that high initial 
returns are associated with long run underperformance for German firms that listed during the hot issue market of 
1997 to 2001. Lee, Taylor, and Walter (1996) find evidence of significant positive first-day returns and poor three 
year share price performance (relative to the market) for a sample of 266 industrial IPOs in Australia from 1976-
1989; and Moshirian, et al. (2010) finds evidence of short-run IPO underpricing in Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Japan for the period between 1991 and 2004, with average first-day returns of 21.43%, 33.1%, and 34.04% 
respectively.  
 
Neither are these patterns of IPO performance specific to developed markets: importantly for the purposes 
of this study, similar evidence is found in a number of studies of IPOs in emerging markets. Aggarwal, Leal, and 
Hernandez (1993) find average first-day returns of 78.5%, 16.7%, and 2.3%, and mean three year market-adjusted 
returns of -47.0%, -23.7%m and -19.6%, for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, respectively. For a sample of 570 Chinese 
A-share IPOs during the 1993-1998 period, Chan, Wang, and Wei (2004) find average first day returns of 178% and 
slight long run underperformance relative to size- and book-to-market-matched portfolios. 
 
2.2 Explaining the Pattern of IPO Performance  
 
A number of theories exist as to why IPOs display short-run underpricing and long run underperformance. 
Short-run underpricing may result from information asymmetries between issuers and investors. Specifically, issuers 
may choose to ‘leave money on the table’ as a signal of firm quality (Ritter & Welch, 2002), or because issuers want 
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to avoid the situation where investors display characteristic ‘herding’ behaviour. Thus a negative informational 
cascade may render the issue a failure if the issue is perceived to be overpriced (Welch, 1992). Underpricing may 
also be a manifestation of efforts by the underwriter to induce information revelation from investors through the 
practice of ‘bookbuilding’ (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989). This is done in order to compensate investors’ fears of 
potential losses from a ‘winner’s curse’ (Rock, 1986) or through attempts by the issuer to avoid potential future legal 
liability (Hughes & Thakor, 1992). Researchers have also shown that IPO underpricing is affected by corporate 
governance and legal factors. For example, Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (2010) report that firms listing in countries 
with governance rules that strengthen the position of investors relative to corporate insiders underprice to create 
excess demand for the stock. This in turn generates a wider dispersion of shares, and consequently reduces the 
incentive to monitor the actions of corporate managers. In a related study, Engelen and Van Essen (2010) argue that 
this positive association between underpricing and the effectiveness of the legal system is implausible because, 
firstly, underpricing does not prohibit outside investors from accumulating a large block of shares. Secondly, with 
the exception of the US and UK, existing shareholders in many firms issuing in continental Europe and Asia retain 
most of the control following an IPO. They utilise the Hierarchical Linear Modelling technique to capture the 
relationship between the legal framework and the degree of underpricing for IPO firms in 21 countries, and they find 
that IPO firms underprice less in countries with stronger legal mechanisms.  
 
The long run underperformance of IPO shares may similarly be due to a number of factors, for example 
higher agency costs once the firm is publicly traded (Jain & Kini, 1994), and as a manifestation of managerial hubris 
and herding (Schultz, 2001). Brav and Gompers (1997) note that the measurement of long run performance is highly 
sensitive to the benchmark and econometric methodology used. Additionally, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) document a 
‘hot issue’ market phenomenon. These are periods during which the number of companies going public and the 
average short-run share price performance of new issues are abnormally high. Further, Ritter (1991) finds that there 
is a positive relation between IPO volume and the level of long run underperformance over time. Higher levels of 
IPO long run underperformance are concentrated among young growth firms (which typically have higher market-
to-book ratios than more established firms), and that IPO volume is negatively related to the discount on closed-end 
mutual funds (a proxy for investor sentiment). It is suggested that this is consistent with a pattern where firms issue 
to take advantage of windows of opportunity, where investors are overoptimistic and are willing to pay higher 
multiples for a given firm’s share (and hence the pattern of short-run underpricing is observed).  
 
After the IPO, managers may tend to overinvest as a result of excess funds available from the issue, a 
manifestation of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), or by taking advantage of the firm’s temporarily 
overvalued equity as ‘cheap’ currency to acquire assets (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Subsequently, over the long run, 
the issuer may perform poorly as a result of this overinvestment. Ritter (1991) describes this explanation as the 
‘overoptimism and fads story’. The overoptimism phenomeneon has been documented in the literature by way of 
optimistic ex ante cash flow forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses; Cogliati, Paleari, and Vismara (2011) examine 
non-financial IPOs in France, Germany, and Italy, and they find that ex post cash flow growth rates do not justify 
the ambitious growth forecast documented in the listing firms’ prospectuses. Most recently, Chan (2014) find a 
negative association between retail investor demand and long run abnormal returns of IPOs in the US. The author 
argues that this negative association is primarily driven by overoptimistic sentiment investors during the internet 
bubble period of 1999 to 2000.  
 
2.3 IPO Performance in South Africa 
 
A limited number of studies have been conducted on IPO performance in the South African market. For 
example, Page and Reyneke (1997) examined the long run aftermarket performance of 118 offerings on the JSE for 
the period 1980-1991. They find that issuing firms underperform their relative listing sector indices and a size-
matched portfolio of seasoned firms by an average of 18.4% and 13.1% per annum, respectively, over a four-year 
period post-issue. Their results also suggest that long run underperformance is more concentrated among smaller 
companies and companies that list in historically volatile industrial sectors. 
 
M’Kombe and Ward (2002) extended the study of Page and Reyneke (1997) by examining a sample of 541 
IPOs on the JSE for the period 1980-1998. Relative to three alternative benchmarks – the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), book-to-market tercile portfolios, and market capitalisation quintile portfolios, the authors find 
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clear evidence of long run underperformance of IPOs in South Africa over 1, 3, 5, and 10 year holding periods. 
Moreover, a number of patterns in South African IPO performance are uncovered. Specifically, the listing price 
significantly influences aftermarket performance (with firms listing in the ‘500 cents or more’ price range displaying 
the worst aftermarket performance); and firms that issue during ‘hot market’ periods display the worst aftermarket 
performance. On the other hand, the level of underpricing does not significantly influence aftermarket performance.  
 
Auret and Britten (2008) further examined the post-issue operating performance of a sample of 391 firms 
that listed on the JSE between 1990 and 2003. Among other patterns, they find that although issuing firm 
profitability (as measured by return on assets) increases at the time of the IPO, it declines significantly after the third 
year post-issue. Furthermore, long-term investment (capital expenditure) increases in the year of the IPO, but falls in 
years 2 and beyond. This is consistent with a pattern where firms take advantage of windows of opportunity and 
issue during early stages of strong performance. However, this level of performance may not be sustainable. 
Managers may then tend to overinvest, and hence, on average, the performance of the issuing firm turns out to be 
disappointingly lower than expected in the long run.   
 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data  
 
The sample includes firms that have listed on the main board of the JSE between 01/01/1996 and 
31/12/2010. However, the sample is limited to those firms for which a usable prospectus was available. The sample 
period is restricted to 2010 because three years of post-issue share price returns and profitability measures are 
required in order to examine long run IPO performance. In order to mitigate a possible survivorship bias, the sample 
specifically includes delisted firms. Firms that listed on the JSE alternate exchange (AltX) are not included because 
these shares are not as liquid as the shares listed on the main board. Over this sample period, a total of 154 usable 
prospectuses were obtained from the McGregor Bureau for Financial Analysis (BFA) database.  
 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the number of issuing firms by year, over the sample period.
1
 It is 
apparent that the number of IPOs varies somewhat from year-to-year. The number of listings is dependent on the 
prevailing economic conditions. The listings increased in the years leading up to the year 2000, when the dot com 
bubble burst. Likewise, a steady rise in IPOs is observed in the period leading up to the global financial crisis of 
2008. 
 
Table 1: Annual IPO Volume on the JSE (1996-2010) 
Year Number of IPOs Proportion of Total Sample 
1996 9 5.84 
1997 15 9.74 
1998 20 12.99 
1999 17 11.04 
2000 8 5.19 
2001 4 2.60 
2002 5 3.25 
2003 2 1.30 
2004 5 3.25 
2005 7 4.55 
2006 15 9.74 
2007 26 16.88 
2008 13 8.44 
2009 3 1.95 
2010 4 2.60 
Total 154 100.00% 
 
                                                        
1 The number of listing firms in Table 1 represents the sampled firms, and not all the shares listing on to the JSE. However, the proportions are 
indicative of the volumes of all IPO shares over the years. 
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3.2 Measuring the Long Run Performance 
 
Measuring the long run share price performance of IPOs is a complicated procedure, with some researchers 
(such as Loughran & Ritter (1995) and Gompers & Lerner (2003)) arguing that the magnitude of long run abnormal 
performance is highly sensitive to the methodology used. One particular issue in this regard is that there are a 
number of different benchmark methodologies used in order to evaluate long run performance, including the use of 
the CAPM, a multifactor model (such as that of Fama-French 3-factor regressions), or by benchmarking against the 
market and matching industries and firms. Indeed, this is quite a contentious issue: Ritter and Welch (2002) 
conclude that there is a distinct lack of consensus with respect to the proper measurement technique. Additionally, 
the length of the aftermarket period over which the share price performance is to be measured may influence the 
results. Another issue relates to whether to use Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), which ignore the 
effect of compounding, or Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs), which include the effect of compounding 
(M’kombe & Ward, 2002). In addition, one may measure returns in event time or calendar time and must choose 
between equally- or value-weighting abnormal returns (Franks, Harris, & Titman, 1991). 
 
It is evident that research into IPO share price performance faces a plethora of choices over methodology. 
In this paper, the long run performance is examined through the use of monthly Cumulative Average Benchmark-
Adjusted Returns (CAARs), Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs), Return on Total Assets (ROA), and Return 
on Book Value of Equity (ROE). In terms of CAARs, we follow the convention as per Ritter (1991), where the 
aftermarket period is defined to be the three years after the IPO, exclusive of the initial return period. The initial 
return period is defined to lie in month zero, and the aftermarket period includes the following 36 months, with 
months being measured in calendar, rather than event time. The calendar time approach in measuring returns yields 
valid statistical tests and is more consistent with a trading strategy (Bjerring, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 1983). 
Further, Franks et al. (1991) contend for the use of calendar over event time because serial correlation is induced 
when portfolios are formed in event time. 
 
Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a share minus the monthly 
benchmark return for the corresponding monthly period. For each issuing firm’s share, four benchmarks are used; 
the JSE All Share Index, the Top 40 Index, the JSE Mid cap index, and the JSE Small Cap Index (J202). The first 
benchmark is a market capitalisation-weighted index that constitutes 99% of the market capitalisation of all firms 
listed on the JSE. The second benchmark consists of the top 40 JSE shares by market capitalisation. The third 
benchmark comprises the top 60 JSE shares (by market capitalisation) that are not included in the JSE Top 40 index. 
The fourth benchmark is a market capitalisation-weighted index made up of all the other shares that fall outside of 
the Top 40 and Mid Cap indices. The small firm index may be an appropriate benchmark given that issuing firms are 
generally smaller on average.  
 
A few notes on these benchmarks are in order at this point. As Maritz (2003) points out, the JSE Top 40 
and All Share indices are dominated by large resource firms: not only is risk highly concentrated in this market 
segment, but resource shares underperformed the equity market substantially during the 1990s. Thus, the Top 40 and 
All Share indices may not be appropriate benchmarks. To adjust for the resource effect, various ad hoc procedures 
have been employed in the South African asset management industry for benchmarking purposes (For example, 
down-weighting the mining and resource components of the All Share index). More recently, in 2002 the JSE 
formally introduced three new indices - the Capped All Share Index (J303), the Shareholder-Weighted All Share 
Index (J403), and an equally-weighted Top 40 index (J2EQ) – each of which, to some extent, compensate for the 
resource effect, and thus would be suitable market benchmarks for the purposes of this study. 
 
Unfortunately, as these indices were only introduced in 2002, they are not available to benchmark IPO 
shares from the early part of the sample period (1996-2001), which make up a substantial part of the overall sample 
(see Table 1). Thus, this paper is restricted to using the All Share index, despite the implications of the resource 
effect. Due to this limitation, the Small Cap index is introduced as a benchmark in this paper. Although these indices 
track the performances of firms of a certain market-cap range only (and thus may not necessarily represent the 
broader market), the combination of results using these two benchmarks is likely to give a fairly robust indication of 
the performance of IPO shares relative to the market, being the purpose of this study. Although the All Share and 
Top 40 indices are highly correlated (See Table 7), the correlations between the rest of the indices are quite low 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – September/October 2014 Volume 13, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1167 The Clute Institute 
suggesting that the magnitude of IPO performance is likely to differ between benchmarks, and so we should have a 
good indication of overall market-adjusted performance. 
 
The use of this benchmarking methodology over a CAPM-based benchmark avoids the criticism by Van 
Rensburg and Robertson (2003) that beta is an inappropriate risk factor in describing the expected returns to JSE-
traded shares. In addition, Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that one should be wary of considering Fama-French 
factors to be equilibrium risk factors and using them as controls. Hence, this paper avoids this potential problem. Of 
course, all results obtained from the examination of long run performance in this paper must be strictly interpreted in 
the context of the benchmarks used, and inferences made appropriately.   
 
For the purposes of calculating the average returns for descriptive analysis, CAARs are calculated using the 
following procedures: The average benchmark-adjusted returns for calendar month t on a portfolio of n shares are 
calculated as 
 
ARt = 
 
 
     
 
    (1) 
 
Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted (abnormal) returns (CAARs) from calendar month q to calendar 
month s are calculated as 
 
CAARq,s =    
 
    (2) 
 
An aftermarket period of 36 months is used, therefore (q, s) = (1, 36). Equally-weighted CAARs are used in 
line with Ritter (1991). When a firm in the portfolio is delisted, the portfolio return for the next month will be an 
equally-weighted average of the remaining firms in the portfolio. This applies to all benchmarks used. Thus 
calculating CAARs implicitly involves monthly rebalancing.  
 
Positive CAARs imply IPO long run outperformance relative to the relevant benchmark, and vice-versa. 
Put another way, a finding of statistically insignificant (or zero) CAARs would imply that IPO shares did not 
perform significantly differently compared to the relevant benchmark. For this reason, the statistical significance of 
the CAAR relative to each benchmark is tested. Since the distribution of CAARs is found to be significantly non-
normal (in unreported analysis), the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used, and z-stats and p-values are 
correspondingly reported. The Buy and Hold Abnormal returns and measures of profitability (ROA and ROE) are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3 Examining Cross-Sectional Patterns in IPO Performance 
 
In order to examine the cross-sectional patterns in the IPO share price performance, the following panel 
regression is used: 
 
                                                                              
                                            (3) 
 
The dependent variable is denoted by      which represents the aftermarket performance of the IPO. Two 
operating performance measures are used and three different measures are used to capture share price performance. 
The operating performance measures are        and       .        is the Return on Total Assets for firm   at time   
and is calculated as earnings attributed to ordinary shareholders divided by total assets.        is the Return on Total 
Equity for firm   at time   and is calculated as earnings attributed to ordinary shareholders divided by the book value 
of equity. The three share price performance measures are (i) three year buy and hold returns, (ii) three year market 
adjusted buy and hold returns using the JSE All Share Index as the market benchmark, and (iii) the three year size 
adjusted buy and hold returns, using the Small Cap Index as the market benchmark. The three year buy and hold 
return is calculated as follows:  
 
                  
 
  (4) 
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Where:        is the annual buy and hold return for share   at time  . The benchmark-adjusted buy and hold 
abnormal return for share   at time   is defined as: 
 
                        (5) 
 
Where:         is the annual buy and hold return on share   at time  , and        is the corresponding annual 
benchmark buy and hold return at time  .   
 
The independent variables include measures that explain the aftermarket performance of IPOs.      
measures the effect of IPO volume on the aftermarket performance of IPOs, and is calculated as the number of IPOs 
in a given year as a percentage of the total number of IPOs in the sample period.         measures the effect of the 
size (at the time of listing) on the aftermarket performance of the firm, and is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
total assets for firm   at the time of listing.            is the total number of shares approved for listing as disclosed 
in the listing firm’s prospectus and is calculated as the natural logarithm of total number of shares approved for 
listing.        measures the effects of the listing firm’s age at the time of listing on aftermarket performance, and is 
calculated as the number of years the firm has operated prior to listing.         is the annual revenue forecast of the 
firm prior to listing. It is measured as the difference between the one year forecasted revenue and the current 
revenue disclosed in the prospectus, divided by 100.             is the listing cost incurred by the firm as shown in 
the prospectus and is calculated as the natural logarithm of listing cost.
2
       represents the size of the board for 
firm   at the time of listing, and is calculated as the total number of board members at the time of listing. 
          measures the listing firm’s growth prospects and is the market to book ratio of firm   at time   and is 
calculated as the closing market value per share divided by the book value per share on the day of listing.  
 
Several dummy variables have been included to capture the effects of a number of factors on the 
aftermarket performance of the IPOs. The      variable represents the domicile of the firm. A value of one is 
assigned to a foreign firm listing on to the JSE and zero for firms that are registered in South Africa.          
captures the effects of the sponsoring firm on the aftermarket performance of the IPO. A value of one is assigned to 
international investment banks, and zero for local investment banks.
3
         represents the quality of the auditing 
firm, and takes on the value of one for the BIG 4 Audit firms and zero, otherwise.       is assigned the value of 
one for firms that have disclosed a contingent liability and/or a litigation statement in the prospectus and zero 
otherwise.             and        are dummy variables that capture the effects of the post issuing years on the 
performance of the IPOs.  
 
The analysis is carried out using the Fixed and Random Effects regressions. The regressions were run using 
Stata software version 11. The Hausman (1978) specification test is used to determine which of the two models is 
suitable. For all the regressions, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the residuals in the Random Effects Model 
are uncorrelated with the regressors. Hence, the model is estimated using the Random Effects regression, with 
standard errors robust to panel specific heteroscedasticity. The correlation matrix (Table 5) shows that the 
correlations between the variables are small; hence multicollinearity is not a concern.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
As shown in Table 2, the average age of a listing firm is 19.68 years, the average number of shares 
approved for listing is 198,093,267 shares, and the average board size is 8.02 directors. This is in line with the 
findings of Baker and Gompers (2003) who reported an average number of 6 directors for a sample of 1,116 IPO 
firms in the United States of America. The average cost of listing is R8 033 725.27 and the average revenue forecast 
is 49.73%. Table 3 reports the revenue forecast for each economic cycle. The highest forecasts are recorded during 
the period of 1996 to 1999, which coincides with the period leading up to the internet bubble of the late 1990s. 
                                                        
2 An alternative measure for listing costs is calculated as listing cost as a percentage of the market capitalisation of the listing firm. The results 
using this variable are similar. 
3 The international investment banks selected were the top ten international investment banks by market share  
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Listing firms were forecasting revenues of around 59.51%. The period of 2000 to 2007 coincided with steady 
economic growth leading up to the global financial crisis of 2008, and revenue forecasts during this period were 
52.99%. The forecasts during the period of the global financial crisis (2008-2010) dramatically reduced to around 
6.45%, thus suggesting that the crisis dampened the growth forecasts for that period. Table 4 reports the average 
firm specific variables for the first three years after listing. The average growth prospects of the listing firms decline 
over time from 4.51 to 1.71. Similarly, the average profitability of the listing firm (measured by ROA) declines in 
the period subsequent to the listing. Although the ROE increases following listing, it is still negative. The average 
size of the listing firm is increases steadily over the years from R2.421 billion to R3.076 billion. The average buy 
and hold, market and size adjusted buy and hold returns are positive in the first year following listing. However, in 
the second and third years, these returns are negative. 
 
Table 2: Average Values for Selected Variables 
Average Variables Average Values 
Average Age 19.68 Years 
Approved Listing Shares 198 093 267 Shares 
Average Board Size 8.02 Directors 
Average Listing  Cost R8 033 725.27 
Average Revenue Forecast 49.73% 
    
Table 3: Average Revenue Forecast per Economic Cycle 
 
 
Table 4: Average Variables for the Post Issuing Period 
 
 GROWTH ROA ROE SIZE (R000) BHR BHARm BHARs 
Year 1 4.51 0.01 -0.26 2 421 240.74 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Year 2 2.34 -0.05 -0.19 2 763 292.71 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Year 3 1.71 -0.09 -0.01 3 076 828.77 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix for all the Variables 
 VOLUME AGE APPLIST LISTCOST BOD FORECAST SIZE GROWTH BHR BHARm BHARs ROA ROE 
VOLUME 1.0000             
AGE -0.0588 1.0000            
APPLIST -0.2339* 0.1276* 1.0000           
LISTCOST -0.1395* 0.1425* 0.1187* 1.0000          
BS -0.0982* 0.1212* 0.1316* 0.2354* 1.0000         
REVFOR 0.1779* -0.1142* 0.0022 -0.0314 -0.1412* 1.0000        
SIZE -0.0177 0.2712* 0.1093* 0.1558* 0.0961* -0.0872 1.0000       
GROWTH -0.0371 -0.0666 0.0545 0.0061 0.0074 -0.0469 0.0849 1.0000      
BHR -0.2343* 0.0390 0.0924 0.0221 0.1620* -0.0970* 0.0943* 0.0547 1.0000     
BHARm -0.2298* 0.0404 0.0849 0.0168 0.1593* -0.0890 0.0941* 0.0548 0.9949* 1.0000    
BHARs -0.2285* 0.0393 0.0769 0.0152 0.1564* -0.1014* 0.0981* 0.0554 0.9928* 0.9882* 1.0000   
ROA -0.0504 0.0459 0.0440 0.0511 0.0920* -0.0583 0.1341* 0.0186 0.1381* 0.1394* 0.1410* 1.0000  
ROE -0.0954* 0.0381 0.1027* 0.0157 0.0014 -0.0719 0.0665 -0.0205 0.0938* 0.0946* 0.0958* 0.3071* 1.0000 
*, denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Long Run Share Price Performance of IPOs 
 
Table 6 presents estimated CAARs for the 36 month aftermarket period according to benchmark, as well as 
the results of a statistical test of the significance of these CAARs reported in the form of p-values. These results 
suggest that, relative to all of the market benchmarks,
4
 IPOs clearly underperformed. For each benchmark, CAARs 
are negative and statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level (given p-values of < 0.01 
for each).  
 
                                                        
4 We include the Mid Cap and Top 40 indices for illustrative purposes. 
Average Revenue Forecast 
 
Full Sample 1996-1999 2000-2007 2008-2010 
Percentage 49.73% 59.51% 52.99% 6.45% 
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Table 6: CAARs for IPO shares 
Benchmark CAAR(1,36) z-stat 
All Share -52.01%* -5.935 
Top 40 -53.43%* -6.019 
Mid Cap -44.06%* -5.462 
Small Cap -33.91%* -5.183 
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level 
 
Figure 1 graphically displays the time series pattern of the CAARs, as well as cumulative average raw 
(unadjusted) returns, for the full sample of issuing shares. Looking first at raw returns, IPO shares delivered an 
average return over a 36-month aftermarket period of 6.52% on a cumulative basis. This implies that investing in a 
portfolio of IPO shares would not have lost money in absolute terms. However, relative to the benchmarks, the full 
sample of IPOs clearly performed poorly over the period. Relative to the two broad market indices, the All Share 
and the JSE Top 40, IPO shares delivered CAARs of -52.01% and -53.43%, respectively. The fact that these CAARs 
are very close in value is hardly surprising, given the extremely high correlation (> 0.99) between these two indices 
(see Table 7). This high correlation would suggest that large firms (by market cap) dominate the performance of the 
All Share index, which once again is not surprising given the implications of the resource effect and the fact that it is 
a market capitalisation-weighted index. As a consequence of this, as can be seen in Figure 1, the CAAR plots for 
these two benchmarks almost perfectly track each other.  
 
Table 7: Matrix of Correlation Coefficients Between Monthly Benchmark Index Returns 
 
ALL SHARE TOP 40 MID CAP SMALL CAP 
ALL SHARE 1.0000 0.9954 0.7311 0.0291 
TOP 40 0.9954 1.0000 0.6685 0.0089 
MID CAP 0.7311 0.6685 1.0000 0.1443 
SMALL CAP 0.0291 0.0089 0.1443 1.0000 
 
Focusing next on performance relative to the Small Cap and Mid Cap benchmarks, the full sample of IPO 
shares delivered CAARs of -33.91% relative to the Small Cap index and -44.06% relative to the Mid Cap index. 
Thus, relative to small and medium shares, as measured by market capitalisation, IPO shares significantly 
underperformed on average, although not as much as compared to the broader market-based benchmarks (All 
Share/Top 40). As Table 7 indicates, the Small Cap and All Share/Top 40 indices display very low correlations, of 
close to zero. Therefore, we would expect that the magnitude of IPO performance relative to these benchmarks to be 
quite different in size. A similar conclusion is reached for the Mid Cap benchmark, given its fairly high (but non-
perfect) correlation with the All Share/Top 40 indices. 
 
Figure 1: Full-Sample CAARs for IPO Shares 
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Further examination of Figure 1 reveals that although the magnitude of the long run performance differs 
according to the benchmark used, the time-series pattern of CAARs is, in fact, very similar across benchmarks. 
Indeed, this is confirmed by Table 6, which displays the correlation coefficients of the CAARs of IPO shares across 
benchmarks. These correlations are very high (the lowest is 0.9202, between Top 40- and Small Cap-adjusted 
CAARs). This provides evidence that in absolute terms, underperformance is, to a large extent, consistent across 
benchmarks for the full sample. 
 
To summarise, the evidence suggests that, relative to the benchmarks used, South African IPO shares for 
the sample period show significant long run underperformance relative to the market on average, although the 
magnitude of underperformance varies across benchmarks. Overall, these IPO shares performed better, although still 
quite poorly, relative to all the benchmark indices.  
 
5.2 Cross-Sectional Patterns in IPO Share Price Performance 
 
In order to investigate the cross-sectional patterns in IPO share price performance, a regression analysis 
was performed. Table 8 reports the cross sectional patterns in IPO performance. Consistent with the “fads and 
overoptimism” hypothesis, firms that list in high volume years tend to underperform in the long run. The results are 
consistent across the different measures of performance. The associated coefficient on the VOL variable for the 
different performance measures is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the three year buy 
and hold returns. The coefficient on the ROE regression is negative and significant at the 5 percent level, and the 
coefficient for the ROA regression is also negative, but insignificant.  
 
Table 8: Regression Outputs for the Determinants of IPO Aftermarket Performance 
 ROA ROE BHR BHARm BHARs 
VOL -0.3937 -1.1681** -3.4668*** -3.4501*** -3.3911*** 
AGE 0.0148 0.0037 0.0603 0.0707 0.0685 
APPLIST 0.0190 0.1208 -0.0001 -0.0094 -0.0193 
LISTCOST -0.0082 -0.0934 -0.0968* -0.1043* -0.1077* 
BS 0.0046 -0.0366* 0.0411* 0.0407* 0.0389 
DOM -0.1622 0.1208 0.0206 0.0364 0.0983 
CONT -0.0749 0.0189 -0.1327 -0.1431 -0.1505 
INVBANK 0.0289** 0.0451*** 0.0411 0.0376 0.0390 
AUDITQ -0.1076 -0.2464 0.2648 0.2969* 0.2831 
REVFOR -0.0163 -0.0531* -0.0168 -0.0081 -0.0188 
SIZE 0.0620** 0.1920*** 0.0550 0.0524 0.0600 
GROWTH -0.0017* -0.0057 0.0069 0.0070 0.0071 
IPO1 0.0041 0.0430 -0.0385 -0.0262 -0.0405 
IPO2 0.0077 0.2061 -0.0483 -0.0520 -0.0545 
IPO3 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
 
Observations 347 347 423 423 423 
Prob > chi2 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.1214 0.1571 0.1393 0.1390 0.1418 
Hausman (Prob > chi2) 0.4805 0.1765 0.9042 0.8715 0.8485 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of the determinants of IPO aftermarket performance on the JSE. ROA is the return on total 
assets for firm i at time t and is calculated as earnings attributed to ordinary shareholders divided by total assets. ROE is the return on total 
equity for firm i at time t and is calculated as earnings attributed to ordinary shareholders divided by the book value of equity. BHR is the 
buy and hold return for firm i at time t. BHARm is the market (JSE All Share Index) adjusted buy and hold return for firm i at time t. 
BHARs is the small cap adjusted buy and hold return for firm i at time t. VOL is calculated as the number of IPOs in a given year as a 
percentage of the total number of IPOs in the sample period. AGE is calculated as the number of years the firm has operated prior to listing. 
APPLIST is the total number of shares approved for listing as disclosed in the listing firm’s prospectus. LISTCOST is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of listing cost. BS is the board size and is calculated as the total number of directors for each listing firm. DOM is a 
dummy variable that represents the domicile of the listing firm. CONT is a dummy variable that identifies listing firms with disclosed 
contingent liabilities. INVBANK is a dummy variable that identifies firms backed by international investment banks. AUDITQ is a dummy 
variable that identifies listing firms that are audited by the BIG4 audit firms. REVFOR is calculated as the difference between the one-year 
forecasted revenue and the current revenue disclosed in the prospectus, divided by 100. SIZE is calculated as the natural logarithm of total 
assets for firm i at the time of listing GROWTH is calculated as the closing market value per share divided by the book value per share on 
the day of listing and  IPO1, IPO2, and  IPO3  are dummy variables that capture the effects of the post issuing years on the performance of 
the IPOs.*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – September/October 2014 Volume 13, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1172 The Clute Institute 
Moving on to listing expenses, as expected, a negative and statistically significant coefficient is reported for 
all measures of aftermarket share price performance. The coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level. However, 
the coefficients on the measures of operating performance are insignificant, albeit negative. This suggests that listing 
expenses play a mild role in the determination of the aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE. The size of the 
board, by and large contributes positively to the aftermarket share price performance of the IPOs, as evidenced by 
the positive coefficients on the performance measures. This observation confirms that firms with larger board sizes 
tend to perform well. However, in terms of ROE, the opposite sign occurs suggesting that firms with more members 
on the board generate negative returns on equity investment. Thus in line with Yermack (1996), firms with larger 
members of the board perform poorly in terms of market valuation. This could be attributed to the further 
complexity and the associated marginal costs arising from the increase in the number of board of directors. Further, 
it appears that international investment banks have a positive influence on the aftermarket performance of IPOs on 
the JSE. Specifically, the coefficient on the INVBANK variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for 
the ROA regression and significant at the 1% level for the ROE regression. The rest of the coefficients are positive 
but insignificant. This observation may indicate that the reputation of the investment bank could have positive long 
run effects on the aftermarket performance of IPO firms. This result is consistent with the findings by Dong et al. 
(2011) and Su and Bangassa (2011) that underwriter quality plays a significant role in improving the aftermarket 
performance of IPOs. In unreported analysis, the INVBANK variable is interacted with the SIZE and AGE variables 
respectively. The coefficient on the interactive term for the INVBANK and SIZE is positive and statistically 
significant at the five percent level for the ROA and ROE regressions. Thus, large firms that are backed by 
international investment banks perform well in the long run.
5
 Likewise, firms audited by the BIG 4 audit firms tend 
to perform well in terms of aftermarket buy and hold and benchmark adjusted returns. However, the relationship is 
mildly significant for the market adjusted buy and hold returns.  
 
As alluded to earlier, firms that provide optimistic revenue forecasts, prior to listing tend to underperform, 
both in terms of operating and financial performance. The significant underperformance is however confined to the 
ROE estimate of profitability. The result is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This result corroborates the 
finding of Cogliati et al. (2011) that IPO firms overestimate their aftermarket growth prospects. Further, Auret and 
Britten (2008) argue that firms usually list after a period of superior performance. It is likely that this exceptional pre 
listing performance causes managers to overestimate their future profit forecasts. In unreported analysis, we further 
investigate the effects of overoptimistic forecasts in high volume years. We create a dummy variable to capture 
firms with optimistic revenue forecasts that are above 17.9% (The median forecast). This dummy variable is 
interacted with the VOL variable. The coefficient on the interactive term is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This shows that firms with overoptimistic revenue forecasts in high volume years tend to 
underperform significantly in the long run. Following the finding by Ritter (1991) that firms that list in high volume 
years tend to underperform in the long run, this underperformance could be linked to high and overoptimistic 
revenue forecasts.  
 
The size of the company at the time of listing is a strong predictor of aftermarket performance of IPOs on 
the JSE. The coefficient on the SIZE variable is positive and statistically significant at all conventional levels 
indicating that large firms listing on the JSE perform well in the long run. However, the coefficient on the SIZE 
variable for the buy and hold and benchmark adjusted buy and hold returns is positive but insignificant. The 
plausible explanation for this finding is that large firms tend to have a reputation in the market place and the positive 
and significant correlation between size and age as reported in the correlation matrix (Table 5) suggests that large 
firms are also older. Further, firms with high growth prospects also perform well in terms of ROE. The associated 
coefficient is significant at all conventional levels. On the contrary, the opposite sign appears for the rest of the 
regressions, although not significant. The growth prospects of the firms play a mild role in explaining the 
aftermarket performance of the IPOs. In terms of ROA, the coefficient on the growth variable is negative and 
significant at the 10 percent level. This result indicates that firms with high growth prospects at the time of listing 
generate a negative return on their investment in total assets. Overall, the coefficients on the dummy variables IPO1 
and IPO2, are all insignificant, suggesting that time effects have no significant impact of the aftermarket 
performance on IPO firms.  
                                                        
5 The coefficients on the interactive terms for INVBANK and AGE are positive but insignificant. Other interactions between AUDITQ and SIZE 
and AUDITQ and AGE also reported insignificant coefficients. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
 
This paper examined the determinants of long run share price and operating performance of IPOs on the 
JSE. The study was motivated by the a priori expectation that the information contained in the pre listing documents 
could help provide alternative explanations to the factors that drive IPO performance on the JSE. The event study 
methodology was adopted for the purpose of estimating the cumulative average abnormal returns for the purposes of 
establishing the aftermarket share price performance relative to key benchmarks. Further panel data estimation 
techniques and were used to test the effects of pre listing firm level characteristics and market conditions on the 
aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE for the period 1999 to 2010.  
 
Measured over a 36 month aftermarket period, South African IPO shares clearly significantly 
underperformed the market on average over the sample period. The magnitude of underperformance varies 
according to the benchmark index used, with benchmark-adjusted returns of -52.01%, -53.43%, -44.06%, and -
33.91% relative to the All Share, Top 40, Mid Cap, and Small Cap indices respectively. Finally, regression analysis 
revealed several cross-sectional patterns in South African IPO aftermarket performance over the period. Firms that 
listed in high-volume years tended to experience significantly poorer aftermarket performance. Further, firms that 
forecasted high revenue estimates tended to perform poorly. Thus, the pattern of IPO share price performance in 
South Africa over this period is somewhat consistent with Ritter’s (1991) ‘fads and overoptimism’ hypothesis.  
 
Listing expenses play a mild role in the determination of the aftermarket performance of IPOs on the JSE. 
However, it appears that international investment banks have a positive influence on the aftermarket performance of 
IPOs on the JSE. Likewise, firms audited by the BIG 4 audit firms tend to perform well in terms of aftermarket buy 
and hold and benchmark adjusted returns. Large firms at the time of listing tend to perform well and firms with high 
growth prospects at the time of listing generate a negative and significant return on their investment in assets. 
Although the contingent liabilities disclosed in the prelisting reports negatively influence most of the measurers of 
aftermarket performance, the relationship is insignificant. 
 
This paper has opened up avenues for future research on IPOs is South Africa and the rest of the African 
continent. Research on IPOs should be extended to select African stock markets that have a sufficient coverage of 
liquid shares. The patterns of IPO underpricing and  performance in these stock markets could be driven by, inter 
alia, country specific characteristics such as the strength of the legal and corporate governance mechanisms and the 
sophistication of the financial markets in these countries.   
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